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The political economy of energy transitions in Mozambique and South Africa:  
The role of the Rising Powers 
 
 
Abstract: In a world in which ‘rising powers’ are reconfiguring global development 
trajectories with significant implications for their sustainability, it becomes increasingly 
important to understand whether and how low carbon energy transitions might be enabled or 
frustrated by this new global geography of power. Towards this end, this paper makes the 
case for bringing together insights from three broad sets of literature on: (1) socio-technical 
transitions; (2) ‘the rising powers’ as (re)emerging development donors and; (3) energy 
geographies. In building bridges between these three bodies of scholarship we seek to 
develop an alternative analytical framework that attends more effectively to the global and 
domestic political economy of transitions and whose value is illustrated empirically in 
relation to the growing involvement of Brazil, India and China in the energy systems of 
Mozambique and South Africa. We argue that this alternative framework provides a better 
understanding of how the rising powers are influencing the changing relationships between 
low carbon and fossil-fuel based energy pathways and of the multiple roles they are playing 
in the development and transformation of energy systems, through the development of 
‘niches’ where innovation can emerge, or in reinforcing or challenging existing ‘regimes’ or 
dominant ways of providing energy services.  
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Introduction: The ‘Rising Powers’ and energy transitions in Southern Africa 
 
In recent years the growing importance of ‘rising powers’ like China, India and Brazil in the 
African continent has attracted considerable attention and controversy. Their (re)emergence 
as international development actors has often been discussed principally in terms of their role 
in the exploitative acquisition of natural resources such as coal, oil and gas and their growing 
presence in Africa has regularly been represented as a kind of neo-colonial resource ‘grab’ 
characterised by a plundering of Africa reminiscent of the darkest days of empire (Power et al 
2012). What such representations preclude, however, is recognition of the simultaneous and 
growing involvement of the ‘rising powers’ in the transfer of renewable energy technologies 
in Africa and their potential significance in reconfiguring a range of energy systems within 
the continent. In 2014, for the first time ever, over half of all new annual investment into 
clean energy power generation globally went toward projects in emerging markets, rather 
than toward wealthier countries (Climatescope, 2015) whilst “South-South” investment 
surged to US$79 billion in 2014 from US$53 billion the year prior.  
 
This paper seeks to address the question of how best to theorise these emerging forms of 
South-South co-operation around clean energy and comparatively draws out the different 
ways in which China, India and Brazil have facilitated the growth of renewable energy 
technologies in each country alongside the pursuit of more ‘traditional’ forms of resource 
diplomacy designed to enhance access to hydrocarbon resources like coal and gas. It seeks to 
explore the significance of this engagement and the different forms it is taking in two 
contrasting countries in Southern Africa, Mozambique and South Africa, characterised by 
very different energy systems and political economies. In the first section we identify three 
bodies of literature relevant to the study of emerging energy transitions in Southern Africa 
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and examine their relative utility in understanding the reconfiguration of energy systems in 
the region. Firstly, we engage with the literature on theorising energy transitions which 
usefully situates the emergence of new ‘niche’ technologies, such as renewables, in 
interaction with incumbent energy ‘regimes’ such as fossil fuel based power systems and 
engages with the detail of the practice and politics of these socio-technical arrangements 
(Geels 2002). Secondly, we engage with literatures concerned with the ‘rising powers’ as 
emerging development donors and global actors in the new ‘scramble for Africa’ which 
usefully raises questions about the changing nature of international development co-
operation, the growing significance of south-south flows of trade, investment and finance and 
the geopolitics of resource extraction and diplomacy. Thirdly, we engage with a growing 
body of scholarship concerned with ‘energy geographies’ which addresses energy 
infrastructures, transitions, agencies and materialities and which views ‘energy landscapes’ as 
dynamic entities constituted by complex local, national and transnational flows of 
technology, funding and ideology. We argue that although each of these bodies of scholarship 
have a number of merits, none of them, on their own, are sufficient and as a result we seek to 
develop and apply a more integrated and interdisciplinary framework. 
 
In the second section of the paper we then develop an alternative framework that provides a 
more multi-actor and ‘global’ reading of the politics of transition by integrating these three 
groups of literature and by bringing them into conversation with a number of different strands 
of work within global political economy concerning the role of transnational actors in 
enabling and constraining particular energy pathways. Engaging with political economy 
enables a better understanding of the discourses, institutions and interests that shape energy 
transitions and enhances our understanding of who sets the terms of energy transition and 
4 
 
how, whose interests are served as a result and how relations of power within and beyond the 
state shape the adoption of one energy pathway over another.  
 
Our proposed alternative and integrated framework, we argue, enables a better handle on the 
power, capacity and autonomy that states have to secure and negotiate different outcomes 
with important implications for diverse pathways. It allows for an analysis of the 
transnational spaces of transition by attending to questions of geopolitics, diplomacy and 
international relations. But at the same time it also helps to situate, historicise and 
contextualise the embryonic energy transitions unfolding in South Africa and Mozambique 
by complementing the more macro focus of global political economy on the broader 
landscape of power (regarding aid dependence and attractiveness to international capital for 
example) with a grounded and nationally-oriented domestic political economy analysis 
(regarding the role of ruling elites and labour for example). 
 
In the third section we then seek to systematically apply this framework to an analysis of the 
energy transitions unfolding in Mozambique and South Africa. Our analysis is informed by 
178 interviews
1
 undertaken in Mozambique, South Africa, China, India and Brazil during 
2012-2014 and by the creation of a database of low carbon energy projects in South Africa 
and Mozambique established to understand trends in investments by type of actor, energy 
source and service, technology type and provider, project scale and location, levels of grid 
connectivity and type of financing. The data was gathered using policy reports, press releases 
and web-based sources and then triangulated with findings from interviews and project site 
                                                     
1
 Interviews were undertaken with project developers, industry and industry associations, civil society 
organizations and trade unions, governments, the utilities and municipal level entities, bilateral donors, debt 
financiers, equity investors, academia and think thanks. 
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visits. Before developing an alternative framework to account for the trends observed in our 
fieldwork, we first reflect upon existing ways of explaining energy transitions to garner 
applicable insights. 
 
Theorising energy transitions and the rising powers: the limits of existing approaches 
 
In seeking to understand whether and how low carbon energy transitions might be enabled or 
frustrated by the rise of emerging development donors and the growing significance of 
‘south-south’ co-operation around clean energy there are a number theoretical and conceptual 
tools and literatures that provide some useful intellectual purchase. Of particular interest here 
is the growing literature on socio-technical transitions. Conceptualised as ‘major 
technological transformations in the way societal functions such as transportation, 
communication, housing, feeding, are fulfilled’ (Geels 2002: 1257), a great deal of insight 
into the nature of socio-technical transitions has been generated through a ‘multilevel 
perspective’ (MLP) on transitions. The multi-level approach identifies different sets of 
processes operating across three conceptual levels – the landscape, regime and niche – 
through which socio-technical systems are both sustained and reconfigured.  
 
The ‘landscape’ of a socio-technical system is seen to comprise of the structuring forces of 
ideologies, institutions, discourses and political and economic trends that constitute enduring 
forms of socio-technical organisation. ‘Regimes’ in contrast are made up of the complex of 
practices, regulatory requirements, institutions and infrastructures required to achieve 
particular societal functions, such as housing, mobility or power. This provides a useful point 
of departure for thinking about the role of incumbent actors involved in fossil-fuel energy 
systems whose structural dominance in energy investment and policy shapes the spaces 
6 
 
available for developing alternatives. ‘Niches’ meanwhile provide a space within which 
social and technological learning processes, networking, and expectations develop in relation 
to alternative forms of socio-technical configuration. Niche spaces can often fail to cultivate 
the economies of scale and scope to become competitive, particularly without support from 
the landscape or the regime.  
 
Successful systems are regarded as tending towards stability, held in place through regimes 
with ‘relatively stable configurations of institutions, techniques and artefacts, as well as rules, 
practices and networks that determine the ‘normal’ development and use of technologies’ 
(Smith et al. 2005, 1493). The operations of these regimes in turn create both ‘path 
dependency’ and ‘lock-in’ to certain forms of dominant energy socio-technical configuration 
while others remain ‘locked-out’ and marginal. It is expected that structural changes in the 
socio-technical system occur where there are ‘alignments’ between the three levels resulting 
in ‘transformations’ (Geels and Kemp 2007) or in ‘transitions’ (Geels 2002). Thus the ways 
in which regimes, niches and landscapes interact will have an effect on the form of 
transformation that unfolds and a plurality of possible transformation pathways can result. 
Typically, these involve shifts that permit the increasing influence and development of niches 
as socio-technical configurations, and the unsettling and decline of regime configurations, 
such that what had hitherto been niche development pathways transform into more regime-
like paths. This would be indicated not only by increasing shares of renewables in the energy 
mix, for example, but also by greater power for renewable energy actors in the design and 
development of energy institutions.  
 
There are a number of limitations, however, with this corpus of scholarship and its ability to 
effectively account for and make sense of emerging south-south co-operation around clean 
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energy. Firstly, there is the Eurocentric orientation of much theorising about transitions to 
date. Work on socio-technical transitions has typically been focused on Europe and as a 
result, it makes assumptions about the nature of state capacity, markets, institutions and 
infrastructural systems which do not hold in the context of Southern Africa, for example, 
where state capacity is often weak and institutions are subject to elite capture and lack 
resources or where markets and infrastructural systems are under-developed, as in 
Mozambique (Berkhout et al, 2010; Bridge et al, 2013; Hansen and Coenen, 2014; Lawhon 
and Murphy, 2012; Murphy, 2001; Raven, Schot and Berkhout, 2012; Rock et al, 2009).  
 
Underpinning the MLP framework and its assumptions are the experiences of countries in 
Europe, in which access to energy is more or less universal and where structures of energy 
provision such as electricity and transport are heavily regulated and energy governance has 
not had to deal with crises such as outages and an outdated grid. In contrast, in Southern 
Africa energy access is far from universal and there are multiple forms of energy provision 
operating concurrently, from the large-scale hydroelectricity for heavy industrial use to 
burning firewood and charcoal for domestic use. Moreover, in Europe many countries have 
liberalised their electricity sector whereas South Africa, for example, has a monopoly utility 
in the form of Eskom. Only recently have some scholars attempted to think beyond the 
European setting to include developing countries and specifically sub-Saharan Africa 
(Simelane and Adbel-Rahman, 2012; Swilling and Annecke 2012; Hancock 2015) combined 
with more inter-connected, multi-scale, and regional or global perspectives on socio-technical 
transitions which are of greater relevance for understanding developments in Southern Africa, 
given the extent of involvement by external actors, including the ‘rising powers’.  
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Secondly, the foregrounding of technology within transitions means that approaches typically 
place significant emphasis on the ability of ‘bottom up’ niche led innovations to bring about 
change, but often fail to adequately consider powerful landscape or regime stakeholders such 
as multinational firms, whose behaviour cannot be easily shaped by the state (Coenen and 
Truffer 2012; Truffer 2012). In this sense, there is a need to bring political economy into 
socio-technical literatures to allow us to understand how, where and why transnational actors, 
including the ‘rising powers’, are playing a role in shaping the regimes, landscapes and 
niches of Southern African energy systems and with what implications. More generally 
transitions literatures also have relatively little to say about questions of (geo)politics and 
diplomacy or about the political factors that impact on interstate economic relations and 
domestic and international energy policy choices. A third concern is the dominant focus on 
niches and the elite actors involved in promoting innovation (Lawhon and Murphy 2012) in 
which deliberate efforts to innovate are seen to be undertaken by specific groups of actors 
(Hegger et al 2007). This view tends to overlook the informal networks of innovation and 
diffusion that characterise the development and uptake of many technologies from ‘rising 
powers’ in Southern Africa such as cook-stoves or solar PV panels.  
 
Also of potential relevance here is also a growing body of scholarship concerned with the 
‘rising powers’ as emerging development donors and global actors in the new ‘scramble for 
Africa’ (Brautigam, 2010; Power et al 2012; Mawdsley 2012; Carmody 2011) which usefully 
raises questions about the changing nature of international development co-operation, the 
growing significance of south-south flows of trade, investment and finance and the 
geopolitics of resource extraction and diplomacy. There are, however, a number of significant 
lacunae in this emerging literature. Firstly, there has been a heavy focus on China in 
particular (and to a lesser extent India and Brazil) such that other emerging actors (e.g. South 
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Korea, Thailand, Malaysia or the UAE) have been somewhat neglected. Secondly, there has 
been very little attention given to the role that the rising powers are playing in relation to 
renewable energy technology in Africa or in the wider reconfiguration of African energy 
systems. Typically, the focus is more often on extractive industries and efforts to secure 
access to Africa’s hydrocarbon resources, often viewed through geopolitical approaches that 
frame energy issues in terms of zero-sum games between state actors or that make simplistic 
distinctions between politics and economics, viewing them as discrete analytical areas 
(Keating et al, 2012).  
 
Although a large share of China’s investment in African countries has traditionally been in 
extractive industries and construction, investment in manufacturing has clearly increased in 
recent years (World Bank, 2015) and there is evidence that the advancement of Chinese 
industrial interests is increasingly central to China-Africa relations. At the most recent 
meeting of the Forum on China-Africa Co-operation in South Africa in December 2015 
President Xi Jinping announced a ‘China-Africa industrialization programme’, moving China 
up the value chain – not only by upgrading China’s capabilities to make high-tech products, 
but also by building up lower-end industrialization capacities in other countries. Looking 
beyond China’s state-owned enterprises (SOEs), however, the role of non-state and quasi-
state actors or of China’s wider domestic political economy in driving and shaping China’s 
‘go out’ strategy has often not been properly recognised (Shen and Power, 2016). Thirdly, 
there has also often been a failure to adequately disaggregate and historicise the range of 
different actors involved within each of these (re)emerging powers and a methodological 
statism that usually ignores wider structural forces (Ayers 2013), whilst the importance of 
African agency in mediating these relationships has not always been sufficiently 
acknowledged.  
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Finally, there is also a growing body of literature concerned with energy geographies which 
usefully raises questions about energy infrastructures as sites of contestation, the 
development of which has significant ethical and socio-economic implications. The concept 
of ‘energy landscapes’ developed in some recent work by geographers (Frantál et al, 2014) 
urges us to see the landscape of an energy system not as a physically delimited space, but 
rather as dynamic entities constituted by complex local, national and transnational flows of 
technology, funding and ideology. Geographers have used the concept to describe the 
constellation of activities and socio-technical linkages associated with energy capture, 
conversion, distribution and consumption and the assemblage “of natural and cultural features 
across a broad space and the history of their production and interaction” (Bridge et al, 2013: 
335). Again, however, much of this work has been focused on the industrialised world with 
the energy infrastructures, transitions, agencies and materialities that characterise the Global 
South receiving far less attention. In particular, there has been an upsurge of work on 
extractive geographies in recent years where political ecology approaches have been popular, 
but the focus has often been on resources rather than energy –with energy seen as simply an 
empirical object of inquiry as opposed to an underlying analytical concept (Huber, 2015). 
There is, however, a need to examine more carefully how global energy power politics (e.g. 
around resource extraction) intersects with local energy dynamics in Africa (Büscher, 2009).  
 
Thus we require a geographical analysis that extends beyond the territories of energy 
production/extraction (Huber, 2015). Until recently, energy geography has also largely 
ignored the culture and politics of energy consumption practices with a constricted view on 
who “counts” as energy consumers – namely, individuals in the “residential” sector with 
industrial consumers typically overlooked. It is therefore necessary to ‘scale up’ the analysis 
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here (Huber, 2015) as well as to consider the ways in which uneven access to energy systems 
and the resultant energy consumption patterns reflect and intersect with larger social and 
political patterns of inequality (particularly in developing countries).  
 
In summary, although there are a number of useful literatures concerned with socio-technical 
transitions, with the ‘rising powers’ and ‘new’ development donors and with energy 
geographies, none of them, on their own, are sufficient in making sense of emerging forms of 
south-south cooperation around clean energy and technology transfer. In the following 
section we seek to outline and develop an analytical framework that brings these literatures 
into conversation with a number of comparative and context-specific political economy 
literatures. Recognising the ‘fragmented nature of knowledge about energy in the social 
sciences’ (Obeng-Odoom 2015: 159) we seek to build bridges between these literatures in 
proposing an alternative framework to provide the “unity of vision” that comes from bringing 
different analytical lenses together.  
 
Towards a global political economy of energy transitions in Southern Africa 
 
In developing a political economy of energy transitions in the Southern African context, we 
are responding to calls from others who find the ‘political economy of energy transitions is a 
vastly understudied area’ (Goldthau and Sovacool 2012: 238) or call for a ‘politically 
oriented literature on sustainability transitions’ (Meadowcroft 2011: 70), a demand some 
writers have recently started to respond to (Kern 2011; Geels 2014). Rather than this being 
merely about bringing institutions or the state into the analysis of actors and power relations 
which shape the prospects of low carbon energy transformations, drawing on literatures from 
global political economy we seek to develop a more multi-actor and ‘global’ reading of the 
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politics of transition. This goes beyond the analysis of inter-state resource diplomacy 
common to existing literatures on ‘rising powers’ to look within and across the state at some 
of the key political economic factors that shape landscapes, regimes and niches.   
 
In terms of how best to understand the degree of power Southern African countries have to 
set the terms of their own transition, literatures within global political economy can help to 
get a better handle on the power, capacity and autonomy that states have to secure and 
negotiate different outcomes and the implications for diverse pathways to more sustainable 
forms of energy production. In addressing the neglect of wider structural forces in particular, 
insights from critical International Political Economy (IPE) can be applied to understand the 
scope that states have to establish their own development policies in a context of what has 
been referred to as ‘disciplinary neo-liberalism’ (Gill 1995) where the structural power of 
capital in a globalised economy, supported by global economic institutions, is used to 
discipline states adopting policies and interventions that run counter to prevailing neo-liberal 
orthodoxy. The wave of World Bank influenced power sector reform and electricity 
privatization programmes undertaken in Africa throughout the 1980s and 1990s (Gratwick 
and Eberhard 2008) and the drive for market solutions to energy problems are indicative of 
this trend, as is the withdrawal of support from states adopting more interventionist modes of 
regulation.  
 
This usefully highlights how the type and depth of power sector liberalization inhibits 
freedom of manoeuvre to select energy pathways that depart from prevailing neo-liberal 
policy orthodoxy (Tellam 2000). At the same time literature which examines the ‘policy 
autonomy’ and ‘development space’ (Wade 2007; Gallagher 2005) available to African states 
is helpful in understanding their scope to withstand pressures from transnational capital and 
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international organizations with regard to their differential ability to shape the terms of their 
energy transitions. It draws attention to their relative power in the global economy (their 
attractiveness as investment locations); aid dependence (and the extent to which they are 
subject to loan conditionalities); their degree of penetration by transnational capital; and their 
capacity to negotiate within global institutions.  
 
Political economy perspectives enable us to get at how the terms of ‘transition’ are set and by 
whom and in so doing, usefully check the assumption that transitions are made up of open 
ended choices. They offer an understanding of power and its effects on the terrain upon 
which transitions are negotiated among a range of domestic, regional and international and 
public and private actors enabling a better understanding of the emerging patterns of energy 
access and the (uneven) distribution of ‘rising power’ investments in projects, innovation and 
infrastructure. In particular, IPE approaches draw attention to the forms of power that derive 
from control over the production, technology and finance and investment that will underpin a 
transition, visible in the influence of incumbent regimes as opposed to those entrepreneurs 
seeking to protect and promote particular niches.  
 
This sheds light on the uneven access to energy and the benefits of rising power investments 
in the energy sector since the interests of elites involved in making key decisions on energy 
investment, technologies and institutions do not align readily with those without energy 
access, or those who suffer the harmful consequences of extraction, processing, and 
consumption of fossil fuels, and yet are often excluded from the benefits of these processes. It 
also raises questions about state-capital-labour relations which usefully focuses attention on, 
for example, the role of trade unions representing the large numbers of workers employed in 
the mining and energy industries and the influence this may have on the speed and depth of 
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transition away from fossil fuels (Newell and Mulvaney 2012). In South Africa, for example, 
there are some important policy initiatives around local manufacturing content, job creation 
and black economic empowerment that are having a significant bearing on the nature of the 
country’s energy transition and emerging renewable energy landscapes.  
 
Our analysis thus seeks to examine the discourses, institutions and interests that shape energy 
transitions and energy policy. In doing so we build upon the work of Newell et al (2014) who 
seek to understand the ways in which forms of power combine to determine the scope for 
climate compatible development in Kenya: discursive power (who gets to define what is 
clean, green and affordable; how are the energy needs of the poor represented and for whose 
benefit?); institutional power (where does power lie within and across government and how 
far is it reinforced or undermined by actors beyond the state, especially donors?) and material 
power (who controls the finance, technology and means of producing ‘clean energy’ and 
what power does that confer upon them to shape energy pathways?).  
 
Although complex state-market interactions are a key part of the focus here, our approach 
does not view states as the only, or even the dominant, actor in energy governance. Sub-state, 
inter-state, and supra-state actors, as well as non-state actors both market and non-market are 
also important. We thus seek to develop an analytical framework that is able to show how 
energy regimes are constituted through a dispersed ‘state’ that involves complex relationships 
between multiple actors and operates across borders and one that can account for the ever-
growing role of transnational actors and emerging transnational spaces of south-south co-
operation around clean energy. A focus on global production networks and value chains is 
also useful here in that it helps offset more macro-scale, geopolitical interpretations by taking 
an actor-centric approach to understanding the variegated, country and industry-specific 
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development implications of south-south trade flows (Horner 2015) particularly those around 
renewable energy (c.f. Dunford et al 2013; Curran 2015). 
 
Work on the rising powers also helps to identify and contextualise the transnational spaces of 
transitions by attending to questions of geopolitics, diplomacy and international relations and 
in so doing enables us to get a better understanding of the discursive, institutional and 
material power behind China, Brazil and India’s energy diplomacy and private investments in 
Southern Africa’s energy systems. In terms of what is driving these investments (both state 
and private), there are emerging literatures on energy statecraft and diplomacy (Dalgaard, 
2012; Santos Vieira de Jesus, 2013; Wilson, 2015) that have usefully examined the 
investments that rising powers like Brazil are making in renewable energy (Fulquet and 
Pelfini 2015) and which complement more traditional preoccupations with the political 
economy of resource diplomacy.  
 
Energy statecraft, for example, focuses on the ‘conditions for successful implementation of 
energy resources as an instrument of foreign policy’ (Dalgaard 2012:4), both to pursue 
energy security and commercial diplomacy. Brazil’s early engagements with Mozambique 
and investments in biofuels in particular clearly formed part of a global strategy for exporting 
Brazil’s domestic bio-ethanol programmes and building a global structure of supply and 
demand for what former President Lula strongly advocated as a ‘clean’ source of energy 
(Interview with representatives of the Ministry of Development, Industry and Trade, Brazil, 
April 2
nd
 2014). In this sense it is important to remember that energy is central to both the 
production and reproduction of geopolitical imaginaries of international relations and the 
ways in which the rising powers understand and narrate south-south co-operation around 
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clean energy as part of a long history of progressive development collaboration (Interview 
with Africa Department Head, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Brazil, April 24
th
 2014). 
 
The growing literature on energy geographies can also be brought to bear in seeking to 
understand the geopolitics and political economy of energy transitions in Southern Africa. 
Geographers have shown that energy infrastructures, including electricity generation, 
transmission and distribution facilities, can be understood as sites of contestation and as 
spatial expressions or material articulations of dominant political-economic ideologies and 
geographic imaginaries. Prospects for new flows of energy bring together disparate social 
groups into conversations about allocation, costs/benefits and acceptable end uses whilst the 
development of energy infrastructure has significant ethical and socio-economic implications 
which are not diffused or experienced evenly across space (Calvert, 2015). Decisions about 
which resources to prioritise and where to build new infrastructure can thus (re)produce 
uneven economic development at regional scales (Bouzarovski et al., 2012) along with 
conditions of energy poverty at local and household scales. The energy geographies literature 
has also shown that energy production and use translates directly into control over space so 
that energy is an important physical medium through which to express state authority, to 
extend the reach of the state and to exert territorial control. It also shows that the attempted 
shift towards renewable energy is productive of new energy landscapes and new spatialities, 
some of which are highly contested, raising questions about which landscapes should be 
made and ultimately for whom. 
 
The political economy of energy infrastructure also needs to be understood in historical 
context. In Southern Africa and other parts of the global south, energy regimes are shaped by 
histories of colonisation, apartheid, nationalism, state-led development and market-oriented 
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liberalisation. This helps us to make sense of the path dependence that shapes the 
contemporary features of both country’s energy systems or the ways in which decisions taken 
in the past limit the options available today. As Goldthau and Sovacool (2012:235) explain, 
the nature of an electricity system means that it “exhibits strong path dependencies due to the 
large investments made into grids and plants, perpetuating a mostly fossil fuel based system 
of electricity production and consumption” and is therefore unable to adapt quickly to sudden 
changes. It is thus important that such energy investments are adequately historicised.  
 
Understanding which ‘niche’ technologies are supported or neglected in the course of 
transition, how power relations operate around the ‘regime’ and the extent to which 
incumbent power can successfully resist ‘landscape’ pressures requires a deeper 
understanding of the domestic political economy of South Africa and Mozambique. Work on 
the minerals-energy complex (MEC), for example, describes South Africa’s economic 
accumulation strategy, historically predicated on the relationship between mining, 
manufacturing and electricity, and also provides a framework of analysis for the country’s 
political economy (Fine and Rustomjee 1996). The historical basis of the MEC is a regime of 
accumulation based on low cost state-owned electricity production (via the public utility 
Eskom), cheap labour and large-scale national and international corporate capital tightly 
bound to the energy and mining sector (Swilling and Annecke 2012: 218). As one of the 
world’s largest mining countries, South Africa’s dependence on historically abundant sources 
of low-cost coal for 96 percent of its electricity has resulted in a highly energy-intensive 
economy.  
 
This low-cost coal, coupled with the availability of low cost labour (a key legacy of 
apartheid) has led to the generation of electricity for minerals-based export-oriented industry 
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which forms the basis of its ‘minerals-energy complex’ (Fine and Rustomjee 1996). The 
apartheid era produced an electricity sector exclusively directed towards the consumption 
needs of industry and the elite, largely white, minority aimed at shoring up their power 
through energy independence amid isolation from the international community. This 
historical background is critical to understanding how the structural power of actors in the 
incumbent energy regime is used to shape and contest the prospects for alternatives such as 
renewable energy technologies, through, for example, control over market access for 
independent power producers. South Africa’s electricity system has been dominated until 
now by its monopoly utility, Eskom, while some 44 percent of the country’s electricity is 
consumed by its Energy Intensive User’s Group, whose 31 members include some of the 
world’s largest resource and mining conglomerates.  
 
Infrastructure provision in South Africa is also influenced by a history of racially determined 
socio-spatial differentiation. Though the country’s unprecedented post-apartheid expansion 
programme between 1994 and 2000 saw domestic connection rates rise from approximately 
30 to 70 percent of the population (Bekker et al 2008),
 
one third of the population still lack 
access to electricity, particularly in rural areas. Despite the free basic electricity tariff of 50 
KWh per month, millions of low-income houses—who account for no more than 5 percent of 
national electricity—do not have enough regular income to buy sufficient electricity, 
notwithstanding grid connections (McDonald 2009: 16). This provision of highly subsidised 
electricity to multinational capital is the basis of what McDonald (2009) calls ‘electric 
capitalism’ in the region and has perpetuated a ‘colonial electrical geography’ where the 
needs and interests of elites and corporations are placed above those of households and 
communities.  
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The MEC offers a way of understanding power and critical networks between South Africa’s 
financial sector, parastatals, government, the private sector and the country’s Industrial 
Development Corporation (Freund 2010). This contributes to an analysis of ‘the social forces 
of production’ over ‘technical solutions to the economics of transition’ (Fine and Rustomjee 
1996: 4).  Such an approach permits an analysis of historical power relations, structural 
change and the interests of dominant actors and thus avoids reducing a complex debate to a 
technocratic perspective on governance or, in other words, a ‘policy fix’ (Büscher 2009: 5). 
Despite considerable diversification in the electricity mix and a significant decline in the 
contribution that mining and minerals-beneficiation makes to the country’s economy, coal-
based vested interests as key players in the minerals-energy complex still dominate at the 
level of supply and demand in electricity. 
 
In neighbouring Mozambique, a ‘troubled transition’ (Abrahamsson and Nilsson 1995) from 
Marxism-Leninism to free market capitalism has also produced a very particular political 
economy that shapes the country’s energy sector. Historically there has been a heavy 
dependence on foreign donors and creditors who have played a key role in shaping and 
defining Mozambique’s development agenda. The post-war turn towards neo-liberalism and 
privatization has led to a proliferation of state capture and administrative corruption within 
the Frelimo party-state (Pitcher 2008) where there is now arguably a greater concern with 
maintaining relationships of patronage and rent-seeking than with providing services to 
citizens (Söderbaum and Taylor, 2010). Power remains heavily concentrated in Frelimo, 
which has increased its hold during the liberal period through successful monopolization of 
access to donors and international networks together with a privatization process and natural 
resources boom that has allowed it to further centralise wealth and power (Sumich 2010).  
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Frelimo has heavily manipulated the state power utility Electricidade de Moçambique (EDM) 
to achieve its own political objectives with electrification efforts closely shaped by 
geopolitical imaginaries and a desire to extend the reach of the state and to exert territorial 
control in remote regions. The development of the national electricity infrastructure and rural 
electrification efforts have often lacked transparency or been mired in allegations of 
corruption as projects have regularly been awarded to companies with links to the main 
political and economic elites (Nhamire and Mosca 2014). Mozambique also has its own 
emergent MEC that builds on a long history of an economy based on an extractive system of 
capital accumulation and is currently pursuing a vision of development that is heavily centred 
on extractive industries (especially coal and gas) and energy-intensive mega-projects 
(Kirshner and Power, 2015).  
 
Southern Africa’s energy transitions: an integrated framework for analysis 
 
Within Mozambique and South Africa high-carbon and low-carbon pathways to development 
are being pursued in parallel and interconnected ways, so this is not a simple choice between 
pathways, but rather a case of multiple pathways emerging across a fragmented energy 
system that consists of multiple regimes. In this regard we engage with the socio-technical 
transitions framework not to produce a kind of yes/no assessment of the presence or absence 
of transitions but rather to understand the dynamics of niche development in the context of 
powerful regimes.  
 
In both Mozambique and South Africa the rising powers are playing a role in the continued 
entrenchment of high carbon pathways. India and China have been significant export markets 
for South African coal and even as attempts at alternative energy pathways are made there 
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remain very substantial commitments to building new coal-fired power generation facilities 
as the heavy reliance on coal created by the MEC continues (Baker et al 2015). In 
Mozambique rising power interest in the energy sector has predominantly concentrated on 
securing access to fossil fuel resources through resource diplomacy following the recent 
discovery of significant coal and gas reserves (Kirshner and Power, 2015). In 2013 the Indian 
High Commission to Mozambique predicted ‘an inevitable competition for markets and 
[natural] resources between China and India’ but was confident that in Mozambique India 
will be able to ‘checkmate China’ (Wikileaks 2013). Indeed, India has in recent years stepped 
up its diplomatic efforts around natural resources and renewable energy in Mozambique, 
signing a bilateral accord in October 2014 to enhance co-operation in the oil and gas sector 
followed by an MoU promoting co-operation in the renewables sector signed in October 2015 
(Macauhub 2015). The struggle for access to Mozambique’s newly exploited offshore gas 
resources in Cabo Delgado province has also brought Chinese companies including the China 
National Petroleum Corporation (CNPC), the China National Offshore Oil Corporation 
(CNOOC), Sinopec and Huadian into direct competition with Indian firms such as ONGC 
Videsh and Oil India. These companies are also, however, in competition with actors from 
other emerging economies including South Korea’s Kogas, Mitsui of Japan and PTT of 
Thailand along with more established Western companies such as Anadarko and ENI 
(England 2014).  
 
With respect to coal, the Brazilian mining giant Vale has invested US$8 billion to date in coal 
mining and associated operations in Mozambique, whilst Indian corporations are also a 
growing presence, including Tata Steel, Jindal Steel and Power (JSPL) and International Coal 
Ventures Limited (ICVL). Many firms have pulled out or downgraded their operations due to 
the complex infrastructural challenges in transporting the coal for export along with 
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plummeting global coal prices since 2013 (Interview with Manoj Gupta, Jindal Africa, 
October 29
th
 2013). Significantly, many of these foreign firms also plan to build coal-fired 
power stations linked with their mining operations that will feed excess power to the grid, 
further committing Mozambique to a high-carbon energy pathway.  
 
Echoing some of the concerns in the rising powers literature about the weaker standards of 
governance adopted by rising powers with regard to their investments in Africa (Ayers 2013), 
civil society organizations have expressed concerns about the lack of transparency in the 
governance of extractive industries and about the social and environmental impacts of the 
coal rush including displacement and resettlement of local communities in mining areas 
(Human Rights Watch 2013). Much of the critique centres on the Mozambican government’s 
failure to uphold its resource sovereignty, locally redistribute the wealth generated by 
hydrocarbon revenues, create jobs for local populations in coal-producing areas, or negotiate 
favourable terms with investors. There is also a risk that the emerging coal complex centred 
in Moatize, in Tete province, will become an extractive natural resource-based enclave with 
weak productive linkages to local enterprises, foreign ownership of capital, and export of 
goods with limited or no value added (Besharati 2012; Bloch and Owusu 2012). This 
emerging coal complex has thus become an important site of contestation in Mozambique’s 
energy landscape and can be understood as a material articulation of Frelimo’s dominant 
political-economic ideology and its vision of development centred on extractive industries 
and energy-intensive mega-projects as a means to modernise the national economy. Such 
spaces are also a key part of Frelimo’s continued centralisation of wealth and power (Sumich 
2010). 
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Energy companies are not, however, the only external and global actors that are part of the 
‘landscape’ of socio-technical systems in Southern Africa. The competition between higher 
and lower carbon energy pathways is also influenced by global institutions, donors and 
broader economic developments that configure the landscape of energy politics in ways 
drawn attention to by the IPE literatures discussed above. In South Africa, finance and 
technical assistance from European bilateral donors, particularly Denmark and Germany, 
have been influential in the early stages of the renewable energy industry and have played a 
considerable role in project development, shaping policy, directing research and developing 
the Renewable Energy Independent Power Producer’s Procurement Programme (RE IPPPP) 
for utility-scale privately generated renewable electricity. Prior to the introduction of this 
programme South Africa managed to preserve some developmental space by resisting 
pressures to liberalise its electricity sector and open up competition to private energy 
providers (Baker et al 2014). The RE IPPPP initiative has so far attracted R168-billion 
(US$14bn) of private investment into the supply-stressed electricity sector, allocating 
approximately 6.5 GW of generation capacity, largely from wind, solar PV and concentrated 
solar power (CSP). Thus there are parallel and competing pathways being pursued both in 
terms of technology and the nature of how this technology should be procured – whether via 
the state utility Eskom or independent power producers (Baker 2015).  
 
RE IPPPP also requires that renewable energy developers meet criteria for socio-economic 
and community development and Black Economic Empowerment (BEE). However, 
implementing these can be problematic. For instance, as one engineer working in the 
renewable industry stated in interview (November 5
th
 2013): “Meeting the economic 
commitments of the project can be a huge challenge…. not all developers will coordinate 
with each other over labour and socio-economic issues as the industry is too competitive”. 
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There are thus particular state-capital-labour relations in South Africa shaping key policy 
domains such as energy and industry and the scope for their reform where, for example, trade 
unions have a powerful role in shaping the speed and depth of transition away from fossil 
fuels by protecting the large numbers of workers employed in the mining and energy 
industries or where the emphasis on black job creation and concerns about the need for local 
content and community development have significantly shaped the emerging low carbon 
transition.  As one member of government stated in interview (November 28
th
 2013) “the 
holistic advantage to the country needs to be managed. If the company coming in from 
abroad is not comfortable with these criteria, then it will struggle”. 
 
South Africa’s attractiveness to investors, the size of the market and its strategic location in 
the region and low level of aid dependence, place it very differently to Mozambique in its 
ability to set the terms of its own transition and negotiate more favourable terms with donors 
and investors from Europe and increasingly the rising powers. Reflecting the high levels of 
aid dependence in Mozambique, off-grid rural electrification and grid extension has 
frequently been funded by grants and soft loans from European bilateral donors (Power and 
Kirshner, 2016) who have played a key role in configuring the landscape of energy politics 
and closely shaped the Mozambican state’s capacity to pursue different renewable energy 
pathways. Thus far Mozambique has had a much lower degree of policy autonomy and 
developmental space around energy and consequently less capacity to withstand pressures 
from domestic, regional and international and public and private actors. This may be set to 
change in the years ahead as hydrocarbon revenues increasingly come online and as 
dependence on aid consequently decreases, affording the state more room for manoeuvre 
(Power and Kirshner, 2016). 
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Despite the fact that RE IPPPP has been celebrated globally as a leading model for 
independent power procurement, and also for its progressive socio-economic development 
and community ownership requirements, ensuring universal energy access is not the main 
objective of commercial energy developers whose business models are determined by a 
desire for high returns over short time frames (Baker and Wlokas 2015). As one technical 
advisor for an engineering company stated (in interview, November 5
th
 2013) “it has become 
quite a competitive and commoditised industry now”. The Mozambican state has also 
recently increased the licensing and divestment of power generation operations to 
Independent Power Producers (IPPs) amid serious supply shortfalls, often with no 
competition or public tender, which have in many cases produced cheaper energy for large-
scale industrial consumers, but raised costs for the majority (Nhamire and Mosca 2014). In 
both cases there is thus a prioritisation of commercial providers of energy in ways which 
appear to have little to do with the expansion of energy access or increasing its affordability. 
As a result, the socio-economic benefits of the development of energy infrastructure are not 
being diffused or experienced evenly across the energy landscape, reinforcing the key 
question of whose energy needs are represented and acted upon in policy. 
 
What is also noticeable, however, mirroring international trends (Lema and Lema 2012), is 
that emerging market companies are also beginning to support renewable ‘niches’ alongside 
the more dominant role of European and US companies in South Africa’s wind and solar PV 
sector. The RE IPPPP process in South Africa provides one space for niche development. 
Chinese firms (including Yingli Green Energy, Suntech, Jinko Solar, Chint and Powerway) 
are involved as suppliers of solar PV technologies or of technological components. Indian 
company Suzlon and Chinese firms Guodian and Sinovel are also involved in engineering 
procurement and construction (EPC) and technology supply. India’s Tata Power and China’s 
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Longyuan Power Group are additionally involved in joint ventures with South African 
companies in project development in the wind industry. Our research in South Africa thus 
highlights the importance of tracking emerging global value chains and production networks 
where rising power companies are bound up in wider transnational networks of construction 
firms, renewable energy development companies, technology providers and national and 
international finance and investment coalitions in complex value chains. 
 
There is no specific Chinese ‘go out’ government policy focused on promoting renewable 
energy companies. Instead it is the saturation of China’s domestic wind and solar power 
industries and the surplus of production capacity in China that is one of the main drivers 
pushing Chinese firms towards the South Africa market (Shen and Power, 2016). Chinese 
firms see in Southern African markets an opportunity to upgrade from equipment producers 
to project owners/operators and unlike their rivals from India and Brazil they can draw on 
extensive financial support and detailed market and political analyses available from quasi-
state agencies like the China Development Bank, Exim and Sinosure (Shen and Power, 
2016). Our interviews also indicated that Chinese investors are focusing on South Africa 
because they believe the political and economic risks in the country are negligible compared 
to other countries in Africa. Such was their confidence in the country some even rejected the 
export credit insurance cover available from Chinese export credit agencies:  
 
“Our company is confident with the investment environment in this country… The 
country’s economy is in good shape. But no other countries [in Africa] can provide such a 
favourable macro environment” (Interview with a Chinese wind farm investor in South 
Africa, April 11
th
 2014). 
 
Another significant factor was the perception that South Africa had a greater commitment to 
renewable energy than many other countries (including Mozambique). As one representative 
of a Chinese solar company put it: 
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“We are always attracted by good policy and ambitious plans [for renewable energy].… 
That is a precondition as we couldn’t possibly go for a market where there is no special 
treatment for renewable energy” (Interview with senior manager from Chint, October 9th 
2014). 
 
In Mozambique the rising powers are also beginning to play a role in supporting renewable 
niches, but on a much smaller scale compared to South Africa. Brazilian firms in particular 
initially played a significant role in the development of biofuels whilst the construction of 
Mozambique’s first ever solar PV module manufacturing plant in 2013 was funded by the 
Export-Import Bank of India (Interview with Fernando Namburete, FUNAE, August 8
th
 
2014). These niche spaces, however, have failed to cultivate the economies of scale and 
scope to become competitive, lacking support from the wider energy landscape and regime. 
In part this is because there are multiple fractions of the state invested in different energy 
pathways in Mozambique, leading to the emergence of cleavages based upon competing 
fractions of both state and capital. As a result, there are significant differences in the 
resources and priority given to solar PV and mini-hydro as opposed to coal, gas and large-
scale hydro where potential rents are higher and more easily captured by state elites and 
incumbent regime interests, the largest beneficiaries. 
 
It is also important to recognise the differences that exist within the state. Mozambique’s 
National Energy Fund (Fundo de Energia - FUNAE) set up within the Ministry of Energy in 
1997 has been addressing off-grid energy access and has a focus on renewable energy and 
rural (off-grid) electrification funded largely by donors, whilst other elements of the state 
apparatus, such as the Ministry of Mineral Resources and Energy (MIREME) and EDM 
working together with foreign mining and infrastructure companies, pursue hydrocarbon 
revenue streams, extractive industries and fossil-fuel based power generation. FUNAE’s 
concern with renewable energy has thus been somewhat under-resourced (relative to the 
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pursuit of lucrative hydrocarbon revenues) and has frequently been seen as driven by the 
finance and priorities of development donors.  
 
Characterised by a history of colonial underdevelopment and following decades of civil war 
the socio-technical energy system of Mozambique has an extremely limited grid 
infrastructure. The state has consequently been pursuing a grid extension programme since 
2009 which has been shaped by national geopolitical imaginaries and a desire to enhance 
state legitimacy and to extend the reach of the state in remote regions. There is a particular 
political economy of electrification, however, largely focused on connecting urban district 
capitals with the main beneficiaries often being local elites, public employees, commercial 
agents and NGO officials with little wider benefit for the surrounding rural areas, despite the 
claims being made in official discourses about rural energy access (Nhamire and Mosca 
2014). 
 
Alongside the development of renewables and the recent extension of the centralised 
network, the Mozambican state is planning the construction of several large scale hydro-
power projects which are likely to become an important part of the energy landscape in the 
years ahead. Many of these are being contested by civil society organizations, such as Justiça 
Ambiental!, which have expressed concerns about the lack of transparency and the social and 
environmental impacts including displacement and resettlement of local communities 
(Interview with Daniel Ribeiro, Justiça Ambiental!, October 23
rd
 2013). The distribution of 
impacts from energy production (who benefits and who experiences the burdens) relates to 
decision making processes (who participates and influences policy): hence questions of social 
and political power are central within Mozambique’s power sector. As Isaacman and 
Isaacman (2013) have argued, the overarching focus of recent energy and development 
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discourses on hydroelectricity foments a powerful type of ‘post-colonial amnesia’ given that 
some of the planned projects are just a short distance from Cahora Bassa, the construction of 
which during the late colonial period had significant implications in terms of population 
displacement, lost livelihoods and deteriorated ecosystems.  
 
Indeed, this focus on hydroelectricity, rather than opportunities for small-scale distributed 
renewables, appears to be the priority for some of the rising powers interested in 
Mozambique’s energy system. Chinese firms have undertaken feasibility studies around the 
potential for large-scale hydro-power projects and are also becoming involved in the 
construction of electricity transmission infrastructure in Mozambique. China State Grid has 
expressed intent to finance the controversial Mphanda Nkuwa dam and has an interest in the 
Cahora Bassa north central hydroelectric project along with a 46 percent stake in the US$2 
billion Centre-South (CESUL) project to build a HVDC transmission line from the Zambezi 
Valley to Maputo (Interview with Andre Santos, African Development Bank, October 25
th
 
2013). China Three Gorges has also expressed an interest in hydro-power plants in 
Mozambique along with the Brazilian construction company Camargo Corrêa. 
 
Mozambique has prioritised large-scale hydro partly as a result of the path dependencies 
created by Cahora Bassa which saw most of the electricity generated there exported to 
neighbouring countries (principally South Africa). The transfer across national borders of 
electric power has become an important source of revenue generation with MIREME arguing 
that electricity companies should be allowed to get involved in foreign trade and that 
Mozambique could not build a new dam based solely on its own electricity needs (AllAfrica, 
2015). Indeed, Mphanda Nkuwa’s construction depends on Eskom’s commitment to buy 
most of its electricity (Isaacman and Isaacman, 2013), neatly connecting the political 
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economy of energy in Mozambique to South Africa’s minerals-energy complex and 
illustrating South Africa’s own rising power status.  
 
Mozambique’s major energy developments in coal, gas and hydroelectricity have thus been 
heavily shaped by elites involved in making key decisions on energy investment, 
technologies and institutions working together with fractions of international capital 
increasingly sourced from the ‘rising powers’. The generation of power by IPPs and the sale 
of electricity to regional markets is symptomatic of emerging forms of ‘electric capitalism’ 
(McDonald 2009) and arguably offers Mozambican elites much more lucrative opportunities 
for accumulation than do small-scale distributed renewable technologies (Power and 
Kirshner, 2016) with significant implications for the speed and depth of energy transition and 
the (uneven) distribution of ‘rising power’ investments in projects, innovation and 
infrastructure. 
 
Conclusions: energy regimes, the ‘rising powers’ and Southern Africa 
 
In seeking to understand, theorise and accelerate transitions towards a low carbon economy, 
we have argued that it is necessary to integrate insights from a number of disciplines in order 
to adequately comprehend the complexity of this process. In building bridges between 
literatures concerned with socio-technical transitions, ‘the rising powers’ as (re)emerging 
development donors and energy geographies we sought to develop an alternative analytical 
framework that attends more effectively to the global and domestic political economy of 
transitions. The value of this integrated and interdisciplinary approach was illustrated 
empirically in relation to the growing involvement of Brazil, India and China in the energy 
systems of Mozambique and South Africa. In both countries there is clear evidence of 
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competition between lower and higher carbon trajectories and despite substantial domestic 
and foreign (including ‘rising power’) investments in new infrastructures, levels of energy 
poverty remain very high. In part this is due to particular regimes of accumulation in each 
country centred on the generation of electricity for minerals-based export-oriented industry 
and a prioritisation of private commercial providers of energy in ways which appear to have 
little to do with the expansion of energy access. As a result, the development of infrastructure 
across the energy landscapes of both countries is socially and spatially uneven and 
consequently there is a risk (particularly in Mozambique) of perpetuating a ‘colonial 
electrical geography’ (McDonald, 2009) where the needs and interests of elites and 
corporations are placed above those of households and communities. 
 
We suggest that international political economy provides valuable insights about the degree 
of policy autonomy and developmental space that states in Southern Africa have to negotiate 
the terms of their own energy transitions and helps to correct the a-political and a-material 
basis of much transitions theorising. It does so by foregrounding relationships between the 
state, capital and labour, while placing them in a more global context, and fostering an 
appreciation of the uneven power to create and contest transitions based on control of 
production, technology and finance. We also suggest, however, that IPE’s focus on the 
complex interactions between states and markets and between states, capital and labour can 
be usefully complemented by the more granular focus of transitions work on how niches and 
regimes produce and resist change within particular sites of socio-technical innovation and 
competition in a manner which is subject to broader (global) political economies, but not 
reducible to them. With respect to the role of the rising powers in reconfiguring energy 
systems in the two countries, we drew on, but also sought to nuance, approaches concerned 
with the changing nature of international development co-operation, the growing significance 
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of south-south flows of trade, investment and finance and the geopolitics of resource 
extraction and diplomacy. In drawing on the energy geographies literature we sought to show 
that Southern Africa’s energy infrastructures can be understood as sites of contestation and as 
spatial expressions or material articulations of dominant political-economic ideologies and 
geographic imaginaries and we conceptualised the region’s ‘energy landscapes’ as dynamic 
entities constituted by complex local, national and transnational flows of technology, funding 
and ideology.  
 
We sought to go beyond the narrow inter-state focus on resource diplomacy to look within 
and beyond the state at uneven power in the competition over competing energy trajectories 
and to develop a genuinely transnational understanding of energy, one that is able to track 
global value chains and production networks and to capture complex linkages between 
diverse transnational actors from development donors to national energy companies. This, we 
argue, provides a richer account of the terrain of power (discursive, institutional and material) 
upon which a range of actors and institutions operate across a vast array of political and 
institutional settings and upon which competing visions play out about what forms transitions 
should take, at what pace and on whose terms. To adequately understand the historical 
context and contemporary dimensions of the politics of energy in South Africa and 
Mozambique meanwhile, we drew on literature on the domestic political economy of the two 
countries to account for the forms that incumbent power takes and how this shapes the 
prospects of low carbon energy transitions. Taken together this provides a more rounded 
sense of the drivers of transition and the role of key actors such as the ‘rising powers’ in this 
process. 
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While noting both the on-going power of the incumbent regime in Mozambique and South 
Africa and the central role that fossil fuels play in the strategies of state and commercial elites 
in the two countries, we have presented evidence both of embryonic attempts to diversify the 
energy mix and increased interest on the part of ‘rising powers’ in renewable technologies 
and infrastructures as part of moves towards a lower carbon economy. Low carbon transitions 
are being pursued and enacted in different ways across these regimes. In the case of South 
Africa and Mozambique, the regime is often supported and developed by international or 
regional interests that are far more powerful than any national entity and we observed a 
diversity of support for different energy pathways within the state. This lends support to calls 
for more inter-connected, multi-scale, and regional or global perspectives on socio-technical 
transitions (Truffer 2012). Indeed, the presence of the ‘rising powers’ in energy systems in 
Southern Africa underscores the need to enrich insights from transitions literatures that have 
largely evolved in Northern settings with the realities of the political economy of energy 
transition in the global South. 
 
In terms of developing a future, more global, agenda for undertaking research on low carbon 
transitions beyond European contexts, it is crucial to further develop the conceptual 
engagement between different strands of (global) political economy and theories of socio-
technical transition in order to capture the complex assemblages of practices, technologies 
and actors that shape energy transitions. In all cases an account of where a country is located 
in the global geography of energy has to be complemented by an appreciation of what is 
unique about the historical, material, political and economic context in which energy 
transitions are unfolding and which will strongly configure the form they take and who 
benefits from them. Engaging more directly with the political economies of transition enables 
a better understanding of how energy regimes serve to promote the interests of some actors 
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and interests at the expense of others and whether and how global institutions can support 
transitions that are both lower carbon and socially just (Newell and Mulvaney, 2012; Swilling 
and Annecke 2012). This implies a more dynamic understanding of the emergent cleavages 
within states and within capital seeking to either protect conventional accumulation activities 
or experiment with new forms of lower carbon accumulation or indeed both trajectories 
simultaneously. This is critical for conceptualizing the role of the ‘rising powers’ in regimes, 
as at once ‘part’ of the governing of existing energy regimes and as ‘external’ actors seeking 
to intervene, invest and innovate within energy systems. 
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